Abstract: The European Commission actively evaluates occupational entry restrictions in all member states. This has attracted a growing interest among scholars of the German crafts sector as it is governed by an idiosyncratic national set of rules. We estimate the effects of the deregulation of the German Trade and Crafts Code in 2004 on the overall vocational training levels in affected crafts trades. We employ Difference-in-Differences regressions as well as Synthetic Control Methods on data for the entire population of the German crafts sector. We provide evidence that the overall effect of the reform on vocational training levels was negative. While we cannot comprehensively rule out all potential confounding factors, we address competing explanations related to demand shocks, recession effect, and migration. In addition, there is evidence that the overall deregulation effects can be decomposed into a sunkcost-channel and a firm size channel.
Introduction
The legally defined skilled crafts sector constitutes an integral part of the German economy; it comprises small and medium-sized enterprises from a variety of sectors.
1 According to Müller (2017) , 16 % of all companies and 13 % of all regular employees belong to this sector. Its regulatory framework is based on the Trade and Crafts Code (TCC hereafter). Among other things, the TCC determines which trades belong to the skilled crafts sector and what mandatory qualifications are required for being self-employed. 2 In 2004, the TCC was deregulated to some degree. Qualification requirements are no longer a necessary prerequisite for market entry in about half of all crafts trades. The reduction of entry barriers in regulated professions ranks highly on the current European policy agenda. The European Commission (EC) actively evaluates national regulatory schemes as they may hinder the movement of goods, services, and labor in the common market area (EC 2013) . While the EC appears to favor occupational deregulation such as the one that occurred in the German crafts sector in 2004, recent national policy debates in Germany have taken a more critical stance on the reform's success and the new government has included the topic in its coalition agreement of 2018.
Since the 2004 TCC reform was implemented, several scholars have investigated the effects of this occupational deregulation. So far, two main strands have emerged in the literature. The first one is concerned with the impact of the TCC reform on entrepreneurial activity (e. g. Rostam-Afschar 2014; Koch/Nielen 2017; Runst et al. 2018) . The results of these analyses show that, with the year 2004, entry and exit rates increased markedly in deregulated trades.
A second strand of the literature refers to the effects of the TCC reform on income in deregulated trades (e. g. Bol 2014; Lergetporer et al. 2016; Damelang et al. 2017; Fredriksen 2017) . This field of research relates to the standard monopoly effects of entry regulations. Overall, the results of these studies are not consistent. Most of them suggest, however, that the income effects of the TCC reforms are negative, but most likely rather small. In addition to these two main strands of the literature, previous research has pointed toward the positive effect of deregulation on the proportion of migrants in the crafts sector (Runst 2018) .
Until now, to our knowledge, there is only one paper (Koch/Nielen 2017) that examines the effects of the 2004 TCC reform on crafts enterprise's 1 In the Trade and Crafts Code, more than 100 trades are defined as parts of the skilled crafts sector. For example, main construction trades such as bricklayers or carpenters belong to the crafts as well as finishing trades (e. g. plumbers or joiners), trades for industrial needs (e. g. precision engineers or electrical machine engineers), automobile trades (e. g. automotive mechatronics technicians), foodstuffs trades (e. g. bakers or butchers), health trades (e.g orthotic technicians or hearing aid acousticians) and trades for private needs (e. g. hairdessers or chimney sweeps). 2 Trades are sub-sectors of the crafts sector. They are legally defined in the TCC and comprise trades as diverse as bakers, butchers, car mechanics or orthopedic technicians. One trade contains one or more occupations. engagement in the dual Vocational Education and Training (VET) system. This is rather surprising given the fact that training of skilled workers within the crafts sector, which is relatively higher than in other sectors of the economy, 3 was a major point for discussion in the policy debate prior to the reform. Critics of the TCC reform often claimed that removing occupational licensing requirements will lead to less engagement of crafts companies in the dual VET system and that this would be associated with negative externalities for the German economy as a whole. The initiators of the TCC reform, on the other hand, expected positive effects on the provision of vocational training in the skilled crafts sector (see e. g. Deutscher Bundestag 2003) . To achieve this objective, the Ordinance on Trainer Aptitude (Ausbilder-Eignungsverordnung, AEVO) was temporarily suspended in the deregulated crafts trades as a part of the TCC reform, temporarily removing the companies' requirement for a training license. 4 On the basis of their difference-in-differences analysis, Koch and Nielen (2017) argue that the TCC reform virtually had no impact on VET training levels in deregulated crafts trades in the immediate years after the TCC reform (from 2004 onwards). 5 Thus, according to them, neither the view of the critics nor the one of the proponents of the TCC reform has been confirmed (p. 84). Our paper adds to the analysis of Koch and Nielen (2017) in three major ways: First, we argue that, in case of estimating the reform effects on VET training levels in the skilled crafts sector, the relevant time span for comparing between treatment and control groups is in fact not only 2004 to 2008 but include the years 2009 and after. Since companies in deregulated trades -contrary to those in regulated trades -did temporarily not need the training license in order to supervise apprentices (suspension of the AEVO), it is not until 2009 that firms in deregulated trades bear higher training costs than companies in still regulated trades.
We lay out the economic rationale underlying this mechanism in Section 3. In addition, due to the occupational deregulation, many new crafts firms entered the market after 2004 and these firms are less likely to be engaged in vocational training as they remained small. The number of small firms increased continuously each year after 2004 and the subsequent reduction in training can 3 See e. g. BIBB (2017), p. 235. 4 As part of a more general attempt to increase vocational training in Germany, the Ordinance on Trainer Aptitude (AEVO) was suspended between 2003 and 2009 in the majority of occupations the German economy to make it easier for companies to be engaged in the dual VET system. During this time, employers providing in-company vocational training did not have to pass a training aptitude exam (see e. g. Ulmer and Jablonka 2007) . 5 Koch and Nielen (2017) are using data for the period 1998-2008.
Occupational Deregulation & Training therefore appear with a time lag. Both mechanisms, i. e. the AEVO-effect and the firm size effect, should have worked in the post-reform period. In contrast to Koch and Nielen (2017) , we identify these two channels and attempt to empirically estimate them.
Second, in addition to the difference-in-differences estimation used by Koch and Nielen (2017) we also employ the synthetic control method (SCM) in order to examine the effects of the TCC reform on the provision of in-company vocational training in the skilled crafts sector. Contrary to the difference-in-differences estimator, the synthetic control method allows unobserved effects on the outcome of interest to vary over time (Abadie/Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie et al. 2010 Abadie et al. , 2015 . SCM does not assume that all treated units and all untreated units evolve in parallel fashion in the pre-treatment period, i. e. an assumption underlying difference-in-differences estimation that is often regarded skeptically.
Finally, we address a number of potential confounding factors, such as the 2008/09 recession, the migration of foreigner and their selective choice of training observations, as well as the possibility of demand driven effects. At this point, it has to be stressed that we may have failed to account for all potential confounding factors. Hence, although our empirical results speak in favor of an impact of the reform on training levels, the reader should be cautious in making strong causal claims on this basis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview of the 2004 TCC reform. Section 3 describes two channels through which the TCC reform might have affected VET training levels in the German skilled crafts sector and hypotheses are defined. Section 4 presents the data set and Section 5 outlines our methodological procedure. The empirical analysis is conducted in Section 6. The sixth section also includes various tests and robustness checks. The last section concludes with remarks and implications for policy-makers.
Background
Before 2004, a founder of a crafts company was required to hold a master craftsman certificate (advanced vocational qualification) before he or she was allowed to set up a business. A master craftsperson's examination is taken by skilled workers who have already completed about three years of basic vocational training under the German Dual Training System. With the 2004 TCC reform this key element of German crafts legislation has been amended. Since then, 53 so-called B1-trades have been fully deregulated (TCC § 7). They are listed in Annex B1 of the TCC. Examples are Tile, Slab and Mosaic Layers, Interior Decorators, Building Cleaners, Precision Opticians or Flexographers. In these deregulated trades, entrepreneurs are now free from any educational requirements for business approval. For them, obtaining a master craftsman qualification (and any other craftsperson's qualification) constitutes a voluntary decision. The TCC reform came into effect on January 1, 2004.
In case of 41 trades (in the following named 'A-trades'), on the other hand, the legislator still demands a master craftsman certificate or, in case of a number of trades, a recognized comparable qualification in order to enter a new company in the official crafts registry (TCC § 7). These crafts with compulsory approval are listed in Annex A of the TCC (e. g. Bricklayer and concrete workers, Precision Engineers, Plumbers, Bakers or Orthotic Technicians or Hairdressers).
6
Right at the outset of the TCC reform, A-trades made up 69.4 % of all craft companies. The corresponding share of B1-trades amounted to 8.9 % (Müller 2006:15) . 7 In the immediate years after the reform, this share of B1-companies increased sharply due to a boom in business startups (Rostam-Afschar 2014; Koch/Nielen 2017; Runst et al. 2018) . With regard to the VET performance of the skilled crafts sector, the federal government expected stimulating effects of the 2004 TCC reform (see Deutscher Bundestag 2003) . Concerning the demand-side of the training places market, the deregulation was projected to increase the overall attractiveness of vocational training in the skilled crafts sector by offering craftsmen a range of new business opportunities, even if they choose not to acquire the master craftsmen's certificate.
In view of deregulated B1-trades, the legislator expected that the range of new business opportunities will cause a general increase in the demand for training places among future founders of a crafts company. As another measure to promote this policy goal, the training costs of B1-companies were lowered. This was done by adopting the temporary suspension of the Ordinance on Trainer Aptitude (AEVO, see Footnote 4) in deregulated B1-trades as a part of the 2004 TCC reform. During the years 2004 to 2008, business owners in the deregulated parts of the skilled crafts sector were permitted to train apprentices without having to pass a qualifying trainer aptitude exam first. In regulated 6 A number of A-trades were partially deregulated such that trained craftsmen were now allowed to start a crafts company if they have worked for more than six years in a managerial position (so-called 'Altgesellenregel', see TCC § 7b). However, in contrast to fully deregulated B1-trades, the extent of the deregulation in A-trades must be seen as minor (see Runst 2018) . 7 In addition, there are also a number of B2-trades (Annex B2 of the TCC). These so-called 'craft-like trades' have not been subject of the 2004 TCC reform since they have no entry-regulations.
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A-trades, on the other hand, companies were still required after the 2004 TCC reform to obtain a training license before being allowed to train apprentices (i. e. by passing a master craftsperson's examination or an exam which complies with the AEVO).
Hypotheses
Our main hypothesis can be expressed as follows: In this section we describe the two main channels underlying this Hypothesis. These two channels are then separately described as subsidiary hypotheses (H1 and H2).
When the suspension of the AEVO ended in the middle of 2009, in-company vocational training in deregulated trades might have been negatively affected by the 2004 TCC reform. The economic rationale behind this can be explained by an institutional particularity of the German master craftsperson's qualification. As part of their examination, future master craftsmen are obliged to pass a module on teaching and training skills (Part IV of the master craftsperson's examination, TCC § 45 and § 51a). This entitles them to train apprentices at a later stage when they have set up their own business or are employed in a crafts company. Without a master craftsperson's certificate, crafts companies that aim to offer in-house vocational training must prove that their training personnel is qualified in accordance to the AEVO. The trainer aptitude examination intends to ensure that minimum qualification standards are maintained during in-company vocational training. In case of the German skilled crafts sector, there is an equivalent to a trainer aptitude examination: Part IV of the master craftsperson's examination (TCC § 22b). In theory, this institutional feature should lower the costs of vocational training for companies in regulated crafts trades. The underlying effect, discussed by Kucera (1990) , can be described as follows: In regulated crafts trades, a master craftsmen's certificate is a necessary prerequisite for market entry. At a later stage, after the company has been founded, a business owner can decide whether to offer in-house vocational training or not. At that point, the time and money spent on acquiring a master craftsman's certificate (including Part IV to validate teaching and training skills) are sunk costs. In deregulated crafts trades, the situation is quite different. Here, a master craftsman's certificate is no longer needed for being self-employed in the first place when a company is entering the market. As a result, companies in the deregulated trades have to take into account the time and money necessary to pass a trainer aptitude examination if they choose to offer vocational training at a later stage. Smaller firms in particular, will suffer from the absence of the owner (or executive level employee) during the period that is necessary for obtaining the training-certificate.
Due to this sunk cost effect, the VET training levels of deregulated B1-trades should have been lowered as a result of the 2004 TCC reform. However, it is crucial to note, that this effect could not fully exert its full influence until the year 2009, when the suspension of the AEVO came to an end. This might explain why Koch and Nielen (2017) did not find any causal effects on vocational training in B1-companies in the immediate years after the reform up to 2008. In sum, we therefore hypothesize:
H1: Due to the temporal AEVO-amendment, the TCC reform had a negative impact on incompany vocational training in deregulated trades after 2008.
In addition to the AEVO-effect, the fall in average firm size resulting from the TCC reform might have caused a fall in vocational training activity within deregulated trades as well. In the years after 2004, we observe a pronounced decrease of average firm size within deregulated B1-trades. Müller (2012) provides some evidence in this regard. Based on the first official census on the German crafts sector since 1995, the author compared the change in firm size structures for A-and B1-trades for the survey years of 1995 and 2008. The results show that the number of B1-companies employing less than 5 employees rose by 124.9 %. During the same time, the number of microenterprises increased in regulated A-trades, too. However, the corresponding percentage increase only amounts to 60.4 %. One explanation for this finding is the fact that many of the B1-companies founded after the 2004 TCC reform are one-person-enterprises. For the year 2010, Müller and Vogt (2014) show that one-person-enterprises make up nearly one-third of the businesses founded in regulated A-trades, whereas in case of deregulated B1-trades this share is nearly double.
We expect that the decrease of firm sizes in B1-trades reduced the likelihood of companies to offer training places, as microenterprises (including one-person-enterprises) often cannot bear the costs and time associated with vocational training due to a general lack of in-house capacities. That is, as small firms are less likely to train apprentices, another negative-impact channel of the 2004 deregulation on VET training may be related to firm size. However, it has to be stressed that this firm size effect is largely indirect in nature, as it depends on the behavior of incumbent firms. If everything else remains equal, the market entry of microenterprises should not reduce the aggregate level of apprentices and new training contracts. However, if large Occupational Deregulation & Training and established firms have fewer resources available for providing vocational training under conditions of a more competitive, deregulated market environment or incumbent firms exit the market, the firm size effects occurs. This is why we expect that this (indirect) firm size channel was initially weak but increased in magnitude in later post-reform years. This mechanism is expressed through the following hypothesis:
H2: In the years from 2004 onwards, the growing number of small firms in the deregulated B1-trades led to an increasing decline of vocational training levels.
Data
Like Koch and Nielen (2017) , we mainly base our empirical analysis on administrative data provided by the German Confederation of Skilled Crafts ('Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks', ZDH). Precisely, ZDH-data on the number of apprentices undertaking vocational training in a crafts trade and ZDH-data on the number of new training contracts signed in a year in the skilled crafts sector is used as outcome variables to compare treatment and controls groups. Two additional outcome variables are created to take into account the absolute amount of training activity in a given trade by normalizing it with the corresponding number of all craftsmen in a given trade (Figure 1 ).
From a research point of view, the ZDH-data has the advantage of including all existing crafts companies in the German economy. It thus covers the entire population of the skilled crafts sector. 8 Another advantage is its accuracy in terms of crafts trade's identification: Since membership to crafts trades in Germany is regulated by legal registration, empirical surveys often suffer from the fact that they do not include a clear-cut crafts indicator (Haverkamp forthcoming) . This can be problematic when a precise distinction is needed between regulated and deregulated crafts trades, as in the present case (on this issue, see Runst et al. 2018) . On the basis of the ZDH-data, still regulated A-trades can clearly be distinguished from companies in B1-trades where no master craftsmen qualification was required for market entry, starting in the year 2004. A third advantage is the long time span for which data is available. Our analysis covers the years 1998 to 2016, allowing us to completely examine the pre-and post-reform-periods. A disadvantage of the ZDH-data is that it is only available in an aggregated format for data protection purposes. Hence, it does not contain any firm-or individual-level information. To mitigate this drawback, we matched our data set with trade-level information available in the database 'Berufe im Spiegel der Statistik' for the years 1999 to 2011, which is provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) in Nuremberg. This allows us to create a set of control variables on the aggregate level of crafts trades. However, it has to be noted that data on control variables is not available for all crafts trades and that it only covers the bulk of the pre-and post-reform periods under investigation (i. e. 1999 to 2011, for the years after 2011 no information is published). Hence, in models with controls, the sample size will be reduced accordingly.
We also use data on the total number of employees in a given trade in order to training levels per employee. More importantly, we use the total number of employees and the total number of firms in order to investigate the impact of the fall in average firm size on training levels in the deregulated B1-trades (Hypothesis 2; see Section 3). Information on the total number of persons employed in the German crafts sector is published annually by the Federal Statistical Office for the years 2008-2016 (via a survey called Handwerkszählung). We therefore constructed a time series that extends to earlier years (until 1998 . Our baseline results use the absolute training levels. Apart from that, we create the variable "average firm size" (i. e. firm size is measured by the number of employees per firm). While the average firm size represents a proxy measure, which attempts to capture the fact that incumbent firms either provide lower training because they face tougher competition or they leave the market, while small firms entering the market do rarely engage in training efforts, the average firm size may conceal the possibility of changing numbers of firms on both ends of the size distribution. Though we do not have data on the development of the total number of firms by size category, Müller (2015) shows that for A-trades, the number of large companies increases and the number of small companies decreases between 2008 and 2012. Similarly, for B-trades, the number of large companies falls and the number of small companies increases. During this time period, average firm size did fall in deregulated trades, while the opposite was true in case of regulated trades. Thus, while we cannot control for changes in the firm size distribution, we assert that the average firm size captures the development reasonably well.
Method

Difference -in-differences regression
In the first part of the empirical analysis, we employ log-linear Difference-inDifferences (DiD) regressions to examine the effects of the 2004 TCC reform on the VET performance of the skilled crafts sector. Deregulated B1-trades represent the treatment group. The control group consists of A-trades that remained regulated in the post-reform period.
Log Apprentices
Log New training contracts
Log New training contracts per person
As mentioned above, the dependent variables to measure the VET-training level of crafts trades are (1) the total amount of apprentices enrolled in a crafts trade per year, (2) The control variables contained in the vector X are the share of women in a given trade, (2) the share of foreigners in a given trade, the share of employees in a given trade with higher secondary education ('Abitur'), the share of unemployed persons in a given trade and the average income in a given trade. Trade fixed effects and time fixed effects are captured by a set of dummy variables. In order to deal with serial correlation, errors ε are robust and clustered by trade (Bertrand et al. 2004 ).
As will be discussed in the robustness section, we also add additional variables in order to control for potential biases introduced by the economic crises in 2009. As the crafts for industrial needs were the only sub-group of the skilled crafts sector that was severely affected by the recession in the year of 2009 (Thomä 2010 (Thomä , 2011 , we include a corresponding interaction term in our empirical model. In addition, we test the common trends assumption of the DiDregression by employing yearly interaction terms instead of a single pre-and post-treatment period. Next, we address the possibility of a demand driven fall in training contracts in deregulated trades unrelated to the 2004 TCC reform. Due to data limitations we cannot include a demand indicator in our regressions. However, we present the development of vacant training places for a certain number of deregulated (B1) and regulated (A) training occupations that speak against a demand driven explanation. Our last robustness check concerns the enlargement of the European Union which took place in the years following the 2004 TCC reform. The training levels of treatment and control trades may have been affected differently by this development.
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Finally, we empirically examine the two separate effects resulting from (H1) the sunk-cost channel as well as (H2) the fall in average firm size in B1-trades. We do so by including an interaction term between the variables "average firm size" and a dummy variable "Post 2003".
Synthetic control method
In the second part of the empirical analysis the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) is used as an alternative to estimate the treatment effect (on SCM estimation see Abadie/Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie et al. 2010 Abadie et al. , 2015 . Employing the SCM is appropriate because we have only one treated unit (B1-trades in aggregate form). SCM evaluates the impact of the 2004 TCC reform by comparing outcome values of the treated unit with the counterfactual case that no deregulation has occurred. The latter is built by using pre-treatment values from non-deregulated crafts trades to create a weighted average that best reproduces the pre-treatment values of the treated unit. This weighted average constitutes a synthetic control group. On this basis, the treatment effect of the 2004 TCC reform can be measured by the difference in post-treatment values between B1-trades and the synthetic control trade. One advantage of SCM is that it does not assume a parallel trend in the outcome variable for all observations in all treatment and control groups in the pre-treatment period, instead selectively generates a synthetic control group such that this assumption will be fulfilled.
The formal framework of synthetic control estimation can be summarized as follows: The method takes as starting point a balanced panel dataset with t = 1, …, T. Pre-intervention periods are noted T0 and post-intervention periods are noted T1. This means that a treatment unit is exposed to the treatment during periods T0 + 1, …, T and not in the period 1, …, T0. The synthetic control is defined as a weighted average of the units in the donor pool. It is expressed as a (J x 1) vector of weights W = (w2, …, wj + 1)', with 0 ≤ wj ≤ 1 for j = 2, …, J and w2 + … + wj = 1.
The values of W are selected such that the characteristics of the treated unit best resemble the characteristics of the synthetic control. Consider X1, which is a (k x 1) vector containing the pre-intervention characteristics of the treated unit and X0, which is an identical vector for the units in the donor pool. The differences between the treated-and comparison units are then given by X1-X0W. The selected W* minimizes the size of this difference.
6 Empirical analysis
Descriptive statistics
Group means of the outcome and control variables are provided in Table 1 . As expected, the absolute VET-training level is higher in regulated A-trades compared to deregulated B1-trades. This is not surprising given that, prior to the reform, the total amount of in-company vocational training provided at the trade level was a key criterion applied by the legislator to decide on which crafts trades will be deregulated and which will be not (Müller 2006) . This selection criterion does not affect the validity of the analysis. While the absolute level of training in A-trades is higher than in B1-trades, this level difference does not affect the relative development of the training in the groups in the years following the TCC reform as long as the parallel trends assumption is satisfied. The group means of the control variables show that there are structural differences between the A-and B1-trades under investigation.
10 As expected, the average firm size is smaller in B1-trades. Most importantly, the average firm size is falling by almost 50 % in B1-trades between the time periods 1998-2003 and 2009-2013 . In contrast, the average firm size in A-trades remains almost constant in these two periods. In addition, the shares of women and foreigners are higher in B1-trade occupations. This may relate to higher difficulties faced by B1-companies to find apprentices, since the likelihood of women and foreigners to participate in the dual VET system is below-average (BIBB 2010). Next, according to our sample, the share of employees with upper secondary education ('Abitur') is higher in B1-trade occupations, too. This may imply that B1-companies often have not built up a tradition of providing in-house vocational training and therefore are less interested in getting engaged in the dual VET system. Other features of B1-trade occupations are higher unemployment rates and lower income levels. Both should negatively affect the employer attractiveness of B1-companies, which in turn increases the difficulties of B1-companies to find apprentices. Figure 2 displays the development of the four outcome variables for A-and B1-trades prior and after the 2004 TCC reform. The graphical inspection suggests that there might have been a slightly negative impact on VET training levels in deregulated crafts trades in the immediate years after 2003. However, beginning with the year 2009, deregulated B1-trades display a marked decrease in VET-training levels vis-à-vis still regulated A-trades. This can be observed for all four dependent variables (see Figure 2) . Hence, the TCC reform may in fact have started to negatively affect vocational training in the deregulated crafts trades on a larger scale commencing with the year 2009. The total number of craftsmen by trade is only available for the years 2008 and after. However, the rates of growth (for the number of persons) exist for seven aggregated crafts groups. Thus, the number of persons can be extrapolated with some degree of confidence (see Section 4).
6.2 Did the training levels fall in deregulated trades after 2009? Tables 2 and 3 (Table 3) includes all years in the post-reform period under investigation. The graphical inspection in Section 6.1 is validated by the DiD regressions. The interaction between the post-2003 dummy and the B1-trade dummy is not significant in any of the 2004-treatment models; including those with further control variables (see Table 2 ). Hence, it seems that the 2004 TCC reform had no impact on the VET training levels in deregulated B1-trades in the immediate years after 2003. This coincides with the results of Koch and Nielen (2017) . 11 As data on the overall population of all trades is used, statistical significance is, strictly speaking, not required because there cannot exist any sampling errors. Following a more lenient interpretation, the interaction term coefficient is negative but small in all specifications. Effect sizes range from −5.5 % to −12 %. Robust standard errors, clustered by occupation, have been used. Occupation and time fixed effects are employed. Note: Sample sizes are reduced in models with controls due to the fact that data on the control variables is not available for each crafts trade and each year of the pre-and post-reform periods (see Section 4). Robust standard errors, clustered by occupation, have been used. Occupation and time fixed effects are employed. Note: Sample sizes are reduced in models with controls due to the fact that data on the control variables is not available for each crafts trade and each year of the pre-and post-reform periods (see Section 4).
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The picture looks different in the case of the 2009-treatment models (see Table 3 ). Now, the interaction term is negative and statistically significant for all dependent variables. Thus, the absolute number of apprentices as well as the number of new training contracts did decrease in deregulated B1-trades after 2008. The size of this treatment effect varies depending on the outcome variable and the use of further control variables. The number of apprentices seems to be slightly more affected by the TCC reform than the number of new training contracts. Moreover, in each case, the size of the treatment effect is reduced when further controls are added to the model. However, regardless of which dependent and control variables are used, we find a strong decrease of VETtraining levels in B1-trades that occurred with a delay of several years after occupational deregulation (the impact of the treatment effect ranges from 13 to 30.4 percentage points, depending on the model, see Table 3 ).
Causality and robustness checks 6.3.1 Common trends assumption
To assess the causal robustness of our DiD-findings, we tested the common trends assumption underlying this estimation method. The validity of DiDestimation hinges on the assumption that the pre-treatment trends of the treatment and control groups are parallel. To examine whether this assumption has been met in the present case, DiD-estimation is repeated by replacing the post-2008 dummy with a set of annual dummies covering each year of the pre-and post-reform periods. For each year, the interaction between the treatment group B1 and the corresponding time dummy is calculated (see Table 4 ). While there are few instances of statistically significant negative interaction term coefficients between 2004 and 2008, all of which display small effect sizes, only after the year 2008 they are consistently less than zero. In every year of the pre-reform period, no coefficient appears to be significant. This speaks in favor of the common trends assumption. Hence, the results of this robustness check support the DiD-findings presented in Table 3 .
Recession effects
Another robustness concern may be raised by the temporal overlap to the economic crisis of 2008/09. In the year 2009, the German economy experienced 
Occupational Deregulation & Training a recession. The main driver behind this was a collapsing demand for exports because of the global recession. The German skilled crafts trades responded non-uniformly to this shock. While the large majority of crafts trades were more or less unaffected by the crisis due to their focus on domestic and inelastic markets, some crafts trades with strong relationships to export-intensive manufacturing industries faced a sharp economic downturn (Thomä 2010 (Thomä , 2011 . To control for this effect, we re-run the 2008-treatment DiD-regressions by including an interaction term of a dummy for trades related to the industrial sector (e. g. metal workers, precision engineers or electrical machine engineers) and the 2009-year dummy. The results show that our DiD-findings remain stable after this robustness check (see Table 5 ).
Demand shocks
We hypothesized that the observed fall in vocational training levels was caused by the deregulation in 2004, lowering the supply of training places in B1-trades. However, the decline may have been caused by demand shocks as well. From the year 2008 onwards, the number of applicants for training places started to fall in Germany due to the demographic transition (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2012: 107) . If the demand for training contracts falls more rapidly in deregulated B1-trades vis-à-vis regulated A-trades for reasons other than the TCC reform in 2004 (e. g. a sudden general preference change), the hypothesized causality of our estimation results would be called in question. 
Log apprentices Log new training contracts
Log apprentices/persons Log new training contracts/persons In Section 6.1 it is shown that B1-trades are characterized by higher unemployment rates and lower income levels. Both aspects should lower the attractiveness of B1-companies for employees, in particular in times of declining demand for training. Hence, after 2008, the training levels of B1-trades may also have fallen for demand related reasons. Indeed, the results of Table 3 may point in this direction: For both sets of dependent variables (i. e. total and per person), the TCC reform had a higher negative impact on the number of apprentices than on the number of new training contracts. One might suspect a rising number of drop-outs in deregulated B1-trades after 2008 as a cause for this development. However, for both sets of dependent variables, the difference between the treatment effects is rather small (see Table 3 ), leading us to conclude that our results are not severely biased by demand effects. Unfortunately, due to a lack of data we cannot include a direct demand indicator as independent variable in our regressions. Thus, to further ensure that our results are not biased by demand shocks, we use data from the German Federal Institute of Vocational Education and Training (BIBB) in order to graph the development of vacant training places between 2004 and 2016 for a certain number of deregulated (B1) and regulated (A) trades (see Figure 3) . Occupational Deregulation & Training Figure 3 shows that the number of training vacancies developed in a similar manner in the two groups. Starting with the year 2010, however, the number of vacant training places rose much more rapidly in regulated A-trades vis-à-vis deregulated B1-trades. Based on these descriptive statistics, we can rule out the possibility that our findings are primarily driven by demand side factors. However, not least because of the larger impact of the TCC reform on the number of apprentices compared to new training contracts, we cannot fully rule out that the decline in training is partially driven by a fall in demand. However, it is unlikely that there exists a stark discontinuity in the demand for training in A and B1 trades over a short time period. Instead, we would expect changes in demand to exert themselves over longer time periods. Hence, while we cannot rule it out completely and our regression results provide some evidence in favor of demand side effects, we suggest that our findings are not primarily driven by a decline in the demand for training places.
Intra-EU migration
In 2004, several eastern European countries joined the European Union (EU). Within the EU common market area, individuals are free to choose their place of residence and work. However, in a transitional period between 2004 and 2011, the free movement of labour was still partially restricted. Although most eastern European citizens were not permitted to work in Germany before 2011, some individuals entered the German labour market if they fulfilled certain conditions. For example, family members of self-employed foreigners, individuals who lived in Germany for more than 3 years and some individuals willing to undergo vocational training were already permitted to enter. Thus it is possible that our results are driven by migrants, selectively choosing to enter A-trades rather than B1-trades. This explanation is plausible because Atrades generally display higher proportions of foreign apprentices (see Runst 2016: 10) . In conjunction with the increase of migration caused by the economic crisis 2008/2009, this channel could call into question our identified causal mechanism.
However, the regression results in Table 6 show that migration is not driving the relative drop in vocational training in B1-trades compared to A-trades after 2008. The number of foreign apprentices in each trade and year has been subtracted from our dependent variable, leaving us with German apprentices only. Specifications (1) to (4) replicate our main results of Table 3 . It can be seen that effects sizes are similar and remain statistically significant.
Disentangling the sunk-cost channel and the firm-size channel
Hypothesis 1 highlights the sunk-cost channel. Companies in the regulated A-trades are relatively more likely to train apprentices because the time and money spent on acquiring a training licence is sunk when the decision whether to train or not as to be made. The owner (or executive level employees) has acquired his/her training license by passing a master craftsmen's certificate Table 6 : DiD-regressions (German apprentices only).
Log apprentices Log apprentices/persons 
Controls on year and trade yes yes yes yes
p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Robust standard errors, clustered by occupation, have been used. Occupation and time fixed effects are employed. Note: Sample sizes are reduced in models with controls due to the fact that data on the control variables is not available for each crafts trade and each year of the pre-and post-reform periods (see Section 4).
Occupational Deregulation & Training (Meister) prior to the founding of the company. Conversely, non-Meister companies in the deregulated B1-trades would have to deliberately choose to incur the costs of obtaining a training license. In addition, Hypothesis 2 highlights the possibility of a firm size channel. As many microenterprises entered the deregulated market in 2004 and after, the average firm size has fallen in deregulated B1-trades. Smaller firms often do not have the capacities to train regardless of whether they are Meister or non-Meister firms. In this section, we attempt to empirically disentangle the sunk-cost-channel (Hypothesis 1) and the firm-sizechannel (Hypothesis 2). The existence of the firm-size-channel can be examined by controlling for the average firm size at the trade level (measured by the number of employees per firm), as well as including a post 2003 dummy, and the interaction term between the two (Table 7) .
As we have explained above, the data on the total number of persons employed within each trade is available between 2008 and 2016. Based on annual rates of change regarding the variable "persons employed" for seven trade groups provided by the Federal Statistics Office, we have extrapolated a time series for all trades back to 1998, enabling us to construct an average firm size variable.
The interaction term coefficient (average firm size times the post 2003 dummy) is positive and significant in all specifications, indicating a discontinuity in the effect of firm size on vocational training before and after 2004. Thus, trades characterized by a fall in average firm size caused by the 2004 TCC reform are less likely to provide vocational training after the reform. This is indicated by the positive coefficient of the interaction term coefficient (as larger firm size is connected to higher training levels). There is thus empirical evidence supporting Hypothesis 2. The main difference-in-differences coefficient, however, remains negative and significant in seven out of eight specifications. To sum up, we conclude that there is some evidence in favor of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Overall, the negative effect of the 2004 TCC reform on training levels exerts itself through both, a sunk-cost channel as well as a firm size channel.
Finally, we combine most of the identified threats to causality in a number of regressions in Table 8 . Thus, the dependent variable measures the log of number of German apprentices. We include a recession control for trades affected by the economic crises 2008/2009 as well as a firm size variable as outlined above. The interaction coefficient (B1x2008) is negative and significant in all four specifications. In addition, the 2009 recession seems to have no impact as the interaction term coefficient between the dummy variable for affected trades and the year dummy 2009 is not significant. Finally, firm size affects training in B1-trades positively after the year 2004, thereby providing evidence for a separate effect of a sunk cost channel (Hypothesis 1) as well as a firm size channel (Hypothesis 2). Table 7 : DiD-regressions, controlling for firm size.
Log apprentices Log new training contracts
Log apprentices/person Log new training contracts/person The choice of characteristics that are used to minimize the pre-treatment gap between treatment and synthetic control group represents a critical step in the analysis. It is primarily driven by the relative success in minimizing the gap between the different specifications. We include all lags of the outcome Table 8 ).
variable in the estimation and no control variables. However, the results are not much different when fewer lags are used. The all-lags-model displays the lowest root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE), which is why we use it as our main specification. The synthetically generated control groups are composed of a small number of donor trades (see Table 9 ) and the pre-treatment deviation between treatment (deregulated B1-trades) and synthetic control group is small in all cases. For both upper panels in Figure 4 (a and b) , which display the number of apprentices as well as the number of new training contracts, we can see that a small gap between control and treatment groups appears before the year 2009 after which it increases sharply. We can also see a slight increase in training in deregulated B1-trades (treatment group) in the year 2004, suggesting that the policy intention of boosting training was perhaps successful in that particular year. However, the positive effect only appears in the year 2004. In the overall treatment period, training clearly fell in deregulated trades. In case of the two lower panels (2c and 2d), which display the number of apprentices per person as well as the number of new training contracts per person, the situation is similar. Here we do find a very small gap between groups that is already apparent for the years 2004 to 2008. However, the gap significantly widens after 2009, which confirms our hypothesis of a reduction in training levels in case of B1-trades.
It can be stated that none of the panels give any reason to suspect a significant influence of the recession year of 2009 as there are no troughs visible. Instead, the gap widens in that year and remains largely constant (or is even slightly increasing) thereafter.
Finally, we ran placebo tests, in which all donor pool trades were treated as if they were the treatment group. The gaps between the (placebo-) treatment groups and the synthetic control groups are displayed in Figures 5 and 6 . We removed all lines from the figure in which the minimization of the pretreatment gap did not work, i. e. visually deviate from the zero line, thereby reducing the number of lines in the figure. The development of the real treatment group (B1 trades) is shown as a solid black line. We can see that the decline in the treatment group after 2004 is stronger than in most other trades. About five or six non-treatment groups display a stronger decline. However, many of those do either not display a systematic decline after the year 2004 (but an erratic one), or their pre-treatment minimization gaps visibly deviate from zero (see solid dashed lines). Overall, the placebo tests do not give reason to doubt the overall decline in vocational training levels in B1-trades. 
Conclusion
The 2004 deregulation of the German Trade and Crafts Code (TCC) abolished the advanced educational requirements for starting a business in a selected number of crafts trades. Before the year 2004, a master craftsperson's examination was a prerequisite for self-employment in all crafts trades. Many individuals, with or without basic crafts training, have seized this opportunity and the number of businesses (as well as exit rates) has increased strongly in deregulated crafts trades after the 2004 TCC reform . In the present paper, and in contrast to Koch and Nielen (2017) , we provide evidence that the occupational deregulation has also lowered the level of basic vocational training provided by companies in affected trades. Difference-in-differences regressions as well as the Synthetic Control Method show a decline in vocational training levels by 13 but possibly as high as 30 percentage points. We present evidence for an economically and statistically significant fall in vocational training levels after the year 2008.
We argue that this decline in vocational training levels can be explained by a sunk cost effect and a firm size effect. Theoretically, firm owners in regulated crafts trades treat the costs of passing a trainer aptitude examination as sunk because it was already obtained as part of their mandatory master craftsman certificate (Part IV of the master craftsperson's examination, TCC § 45 and § 51a). On the other hand, companies in the deregulated trades do not automatically possess a training license and must, therefore, factor in the time and money it takes to obtain it. For smaller firms being fully engaged in their daily business this could be a major burden. Because of this difference in company training costs, we expect vocational training levels to fall in the deregulated crafts trades. However, this mechanism could not operate between the years 2004 and 2008 when the necessity to pass a trainer aptitude examination was temporarily suspended in the deregulated parts of the skilled crafts sector.
The temporal lag in the decline of training after the 2004 TCC reform may also be explained by a change in firm size structure. As a growing number of microenterprises continuously entered the market after 2004 (most of them remained small) and the amount of vocational training provided by large incumbent firms did not remain constant, the fall in vocational training levels in the years after the 2004 TCC reform may also have occurred with a certain time-lag due to a decline of average firm size in the deregulated B1-trades. Our main results in Section 6.2 do not separate these two effects, both of which each are hypothesized to exert a negative influence on training levels in deregulated B1-trades.
In Section 6.4 we attempt to disentangle the sunk-cost-channel as well as the firm-size-channel. We provide some evidence about the existence of the two separate channels. However, it has to be noted that the validity of our results is limited by the availability of data. Since non-experimental data is susceptible to omitted variable biases, the possibility remains that deregulated B1-trades suffered from a decline in the demand for training after 2008 for reasons unrelated to the deregulation of the crafts sector. In this scenario, the TCC reform and the decline in training levels would be statistically associated but not causally related. While we cannot test all threats to causality comprehensively, we nevertheless discuss and test a number of competing explanations in Section 6.3.
First of all, we show that the pre-treatment trends of our outcome variable are parallel. We also present data on vacant training positions for a number of B1 and A trade occupations in order to show that our results are not primarily driven by demand side effects. We investigate whether our results are driven by the impact of the economic crisis 2008/09 by including an interaction term for affected trades. Finally, we subtract the number of foreign apprentices from the total number of apprentices, thereby eliminating explanations related to increased immigration after 2008. While our robustness checks do not raise any red flags in regard to any of these known threats to causality, we cannot fully rule out all potential concerns.
One should therefore be cautious in making causal claims based on our empirical results. Reality is complex and it remains possible that we may have failed to account for particular confounding factors. However, based on the robustness checks conducted in Section 6.3, we believe to have presented some evidence that speak against the most important competing explanations.
While we refrain from making normative policy recommendations, our results are, nevertheless, of particular interest for policy-makers. The European Commission actively evaluates the economic justification and legality of restricted access to professions in all member states in order to facilitate Common Market area exchanges and labor migration (see e. g. EC 2013). Our paper adds to this discussion by shedding some light on the relationship between occupational deregulation and human capital formation.
In addition, our results are important for policy-makers in Germany. Starting with the German election 2017, a debate about a possible re-regulation of certain craft trades (i. e. the question whether the requirement for a Master Craftsman's Certificate should be reintroduced or not) was recently taken up by most political parties. In light of this discussion, one could ask: Would we expect rising training levels in the skilled crafts sector if the TCC reform were to be reversed? The answer to this question is far from straightforward. Economic variables are interrelated in complex ways and we do not presume to be able to predict the future. Yet, given that there is some evidence regarding a negative causal effect in the aftermath of the 2004 TCC reform, the probability that re-introducing occupational regulation in B1-trades would cause higher training levels in the German crafts sector should, at minimum, increase. In this article, we also refrain from discussing the social benefits and costs of entry regulations and related training levels, nor do we address the question whether there are alternative policy instruments that may achieve the same goal without imposing entry restrictions (e. g. training subsidies).
This already points to the need of further research. A further research avenue could be related to the impact channels of the TCC reform. In the present paper, two negative impact channels are investigated on how the TCC reform may have negatively affected the VET performance of the German skilled crafts sector. Apart from them, the 2004 TCC reform may also have triggered an "investment effect" in deregulated B1-trades -an effect that could not addressed by us due to a lack of data. In particular, the reform may have lowered the probability that a training company's Human Capital investment will pay off in the long run. After a B1-company has trained a new worker, this person now stands free to open up his or her own business, potentially generating additional competition for the training company. More importantly, once left, the trained worker is no longer able to generate revenue as a skilled employee of the training company in the long run. In a simplified model, the costs of training must be weighed against the short term benefit received from the apprentice's labor during the training period and the present value of the future skilled labor provided by the apprentice times the probability that this person remains in the company. By removing advanced qualification requirements for business founders, the probability of the leave-option, after basic vocational training is completed, should increase. Examining whether this was actually the case in the aftermath of the 2004 TCC reform warrants a more detailed study.
